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| Syed Shahabuddin is a well known in the political and academic circles as well as in the mass media and does not need an introduction. In his many incarnations he has been a university teacher, a diplomat, who served as an ambassador and a government official who was at the time of his seeking pre-mature retirement, the Joint Secretary in charge of South East Asia, the Indian Ocean and the Pacific in the Ministry of External Affairs. He was a MP for three terms between 1979 and 1996 and made a mark as a Parliamentarian. He has edited Muslim India, the monthly journal of research, documentation and reference from 1983 to 2002 and again from July 2006. He has been a regular contributor on current affairs in the media and a familiar participant in seminars and TV discussions. He has been a member of many learned bodies and associated with several Muslim institutions and organizations. More... |
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| Muslims and UP Assembly Election–2007 Some Gains & Some Guidelines for the Future After many years, a single party has on its own secured a majority in U.P. Assembly and formed its Government without support from any other party in the Legislature. This is not just a return to decades of Congress dominance, because the social order has changed. Instead of Brahmins and other high castes at the top and the Schedule Castes at the bottom, the power pyramid stands reversed. As under the Congress, the Muslims figure in the equation with 21 MLA’s on the treasury benches & 36 in the opposition. A stable Government capable of delivering to the people what they want and what the ruling party had promised, is on the cards. A painless and peaceful, a model, transfer of power, it was not a mass revolution in any sense of the turn the. The Mayawati Government is based on the support of only 30% of the voters and, with 46% turn-out, of only 13.5% of the people. But this change shows a reformulation of the caste equation; it indicates a new architectural plan for the power structure. Indeed, it means a psychological watershed. Mayawati has fulfilled Kanshi Ram’s vow of over-turning the caste hierarchy. At the top the for long, high castes have now been replaced by the Scheduled Castes and they are apparently prepared to play the second fiddle. Socially speaking, the Savarnas have lost, the forward Shudras who had replaced the high castes, and lorded it over the State under Mulayam Singh Yadav, now occupy the basement and the Achhuts and the backward Shudras have taken over the mansion. The All India Muslim Majlis-e-Mushawarat had, before the election, placed two clear political objectives before the Muslims: to defeat the BJP which aspired to regain control of the state and to raise Muslim representation in the Assembly. Both objectives stand fulfilled. With 57 MLA, still short of 75 which is their due, the Muslims are better represented in the Assembly than ever before with a jump of 20% over the previous Assembly. The number could have surpassed 75 with a little more vigilance and effort. The Muslim MLAs constitute roughly 14% of the strength of the Assembly, about 16% the ruling party against 18% in the population. Again a record, but to achieve due representation, the Muslims have a long way to go. Out of 403 seats there are about 100 seats with high Muslim concentration. Even in this election, apart from 61 winners there are 37 Muslim runners-up. They were defeated mainly because the secular votes were divided, but also because Muslim votes in a given constituency were also divided. Politically speaking, non-Muslim candidates of SP or BSP or INC defeated a Muslim candidate of one of the other two. In some cases, the BJP ran away with the cake, even in some high Muslim concentration seats. It is interesting to note that out of 12 Muslim mini-parties, only one opened its account with one seat. All others had security deposits of all their candidates forfeited. This shows that the Muslims have not fallen into the religious trap or followed the advice of power brokers with religious face. They have also learnt to avoid the baradari or the denominational trap, Wahabi-Deobandi or Shia-Sunni. They have thus refined their technique of tactical voting i.e.; voting for the most winnable secular candidate capable of defeating the BJP in the constituency and voting preferentially for a Muslim candidate of a secular party in Muslim concentration constituencies. They largely voted unitedly. Where they failed was quantum of voting. Whatever the reason, the turn-out in U.P.was only 46% and there is no indication that the Muslim turn-out was significantly higher, as it normally is and should be. The Mushawarat had also worked out a list of 98 Muslim concentration seats and endorsed winnable candidates in 92 constituencies. If no suitable Muslim candidate was in the field in a constituency, the Mushawarat had endorsed a non-Muslim candidate of a secular party who was likely to win. Of these, 31 Muslims and 9 non-Muslims hit the bull’s eye. In the State Council of Ministers, Chief Minister Mayawati has included one Muslim as a Cabinet Minister, two as Ministers of State (independent charge) and two as Ministers of State, more or less in proportion to the Muslim strength in the ruling party. It is noteworthy that the Muslim Ministers have been allotted important portfolios. Particularly, the Cabinet Minister Naseemuddin Siddiqui, who represents the Muslim face of the BSP, has a huge portfolio. He is third in the hierarchy, after the CM and her closest political advisor, a Brahmin. Mayawati had issued no manifesto, made no lavish promises but she had ceaselessly traversed the State for the last two years to build up support among all sections, particularly the Hindu high castes, the Muslims and the MBCs, the weakest section of the OBCs, who had been cheated of their due under Mulayam Singh Yadav. She came up with a new slogan of Sarvajan Samaj which means all the people. She promised Social Justice for All and devised a new design for social engineering. She made special efforts to woo the Brahmin who voted for the BSP because they saw no hope of the BJP coming back to power and no chance of the Congress regaining its predominance. She galvanised the people against Mulayam Singh Yadav’s misrule. She ignored inspired charges and acquired support among the Muslims, about 25% voters, though the SP constantly played the Muslim-Yadav formula. She gave tickets to 61 Muslims not only in constituencies of Muslim concentration but in some other constituencies where her own community, the Chamaars, or the MBCs & the Muslims together accounted for a sizable proportion of the electorate . She highlighted the common grievances on law and order, criminalisation of governance and corruption. Her tactics paid dividends and her social constituency, in theory, was expanded from 20% SC to 70% of the population. She gave the high castes who constitute about 20% of population even more seats because they have traditionally held or controlled many constituencies . They won 51 out of 137 contested. Out of 61 30 Muslims, 50%, won. She gave 110 tickets to the Dalits of whom 62 won. To the others the OBCs and MBCs she gave 93 tickets of whom 63 won. The main problems she faces are to keep the Brahmins and other high castes satisfied, and the bureaucracy, dominated by them in line. It has served as the instrument of corruption in all previous regimes. Also she has some MLAs with criminal record in her own ranks. Her advantage lies in the size of her legislature party, which makes organized defection or split practically impossible to achieve. She has thus a fair chance of giving U.P. a strong and stable Government for her full term of five years. If she runs U.P. well and repeats her performance in the Lok Sabha Election in 2009, her road to Delhi is clear and she may emerge as a major and even decisive force within the UPA, which she has decided to support. There is always a possibility that in order to maintain herself in power, she may succumb to the pressure of the high castes and pay a high price for their support but it is doubtful she will permit herself to become a puppet in their hands. Her record shows that she is inclined to share power more or less equitably among all identified social groups while taking care of her core supporters, the Dalits(SC’s & MBC’s). On the other hand, she may discard any section which asks for too much,as she builds up a wider population base by giving the people what they most desire; good governance and development. The Muslim community in U.P. which has today hitched its wagon to Mayawati’s rising star comprises 18.5% of the state population and roughly 25% of the national Muslim population. It is at the same time one of the most backward Muslim communities of any state in the country, next only to West Bengal. What they get, will depend on how the Muslim MLA’s perform. Since 1947, Muslims in U.P. have always supported a secular party but so far they have never graduated to equitable partnership, to having a say in governance and sharing power won by the party they supported. This was as true of the Mulayam Singh Yadav’s regime as the preceding decades of the Congress rule. In a way they have always been exploited and at the end they felt frustrated and alienated, switching support, dividing their votes, trying mini-parties floated by Muslim political adventurers. For the first time, the Muslims have come to realize the value of solidarity. The Muslims in U.P. have been asking why they have never shared power as in Kerala or become a strong political force as in Assam. They should understand that U.P. is a large State and the Muslims are too widely dispersed. They should also remember that U.P in the pre-independence days was the major base of the Pakistan Movement, and the main arena of struggle between Hindu & Muslim Communalism. Over the years, despite the surge of Hindu communalism particularly through the Ramjanambhoomi Movement, the ideas of Secularism and Social Justice have penetrated the mind of the common man to deal on equal terms with caste-based parties in the arena. Any overreach by the Muslim or any aggressive demonstration of religious identity will only serve the purposes of Hindu Communalism. Steadily the national parties like the Congress or BJP have receded in the background and cast-based regional parties have come to occupy the front row. The modus operandi of these parties is to consolidate their own caste vote and then seek support from other castes and communities which more readily comes forth once it has reached a critical mass. That is how Jat-based Lok Dal or, the Yadav-based Samajwadi Party or the Dalit-based BSP sought and secured Muslim support and came to power. Muslim should realise that they missed the boat by not forming a Muslim-core party at that juncture or even a Muslim pressure group. All political parties have their own social constituencies but, with the exception of the BJP, they are not hostile to or suspicious of the Muslims and are inclined to treat Muslims as yet another element in the electoral equation. They are not averse to the Muslim receiving a reasonable, if not due, return. The Muslims have to participate in the struggle of the common man for a better life and not confine themselves to their own deprivations and grievances. In brief, their political strategy has to be inclusive, for full participation in the quest for justice for all deprived sections of the people. The basic problem lies in that the UP Muslims have failed to throw up a leader of stature, capable of negotiating on equal terms with the leaders of other secular parties. Leaders do not drop from heavens, but emerge from the people through struggle and sacrifice, and through mutual trust and confidence. The Muslims have no political weight in UP because they have no leadership and they have no leadership because they can not unite under a leader. So, whether it is a Muslim-core party or a Muslim pressure group, to be effective, above all they need unity. Unity alone shall empower the leadership to negotiate with other groups and deliver on his commitments and secure the agreed quid pro quo. Once the Muslims have overcome their social, sectarian and political divisions, they should line up, to the last man, behind a time tested, selfless, experienced and competent leader and build an effective pressure group or political party. Unity then they have no option but to extract maximum gains from tactical voting. But they have to learn to exert pressure on the government, through the MLA’s they helped to win, on the treasury benches and in the opposition, who should come forth to place their concerns before the government, the legislature and the people. New Delhi As the next general election approaches and the rumours of a midterm poll spread, Muslims are once again being fed by columnists, whatever their inspiration or motivation, with the notion of playing the role of the ‘king maker’. An aphrodisiac, irresponsibly administered, acts more as a soporific, to put the Muslims back to sleep, to wake up on the morn of the election, to be bribed, cajoled or threatened to vote. To say the least, a Community which has been going downhill for the last 60 years and has reached the bottom of the pile to join the SC & ST as the most backward class in India would only be nursing an illusion, if it begins to think that in a democratic system which is based on universal adult franchise but coupled with a minorities-hostile electoral system, a Community , which forms less than 15% of the population, scattered throughout the country, can emerge as a major or a dominant political force! The Community is told that Indian politics has entered the era of coalitions and even small political groups play a big role in national politics in making & unmaking governments, that there are no really national parties, either in terms of commanding majority in the Lok Sabha or of wielding power in a dominant part of the national territory. So it is asked, why can’t the Muslims? Let us first have a look at the pattern of distribution of Muslims in the country closely. 95% of the Muslims are found in 17 states including Delhi. Among 17 only in J&K, they form the majority (67%). In 3 others, i.e. Assam, West Bengal and Kerala, they form nearly 25% or more of the state population. In 7 states, they form more than or nearly 10% e.g., UP (18.5), Bihar(16.5), Jharkhand(13.9), Karnataka(12.2), Uttaranchal (11.9), Delhi (11.7) and Maharashtra(10.6). They form 5-10% in the remaining 6 states e.g., A.P. (9.2), MP(9.1), Rajasthan(8.5), Gujarat(8.5), Haryana(5.8) and Tamil Nadu(5.6). In the rest of the country (18 States/UTs) Muslim population comes to less than 5% of the total population. This demonstrates that the Muslims can have a position of influence only in 9 large States with high Muslim population & that too, only in a limited number of constituencies, where they are concentrated within each State. No doubt, in a democracy, vote is power but the power of democracy stands deliberately subverted by the electoral system reducing their representation & making them generally ineffective. Taking the country as a whole, there are only 12 Lok Sabha constituencies in which Muslims form a majority. There are about 60 others in which they form more than 20% of the electorate. Muslims are, by proportion, entitled to about 72 seats in Lok Sabha which is the fulcrum of power. A political party or alliance must command a majority in the Lok Sabha to form and sustain a government. Its representation in the Rajya Sabha does not matter. Same is the case in the states where majority in the Assembly is the basic test of power. We have to examine the factors inbuilt in the system and the behaviour of political parties in order to understand why since 1952 Muslims have never been fully represented in the Lok Sabha or in any State Assembly. We should also examine the electoral behaviour of the political parties and the Community itself. Let us first see the current representation of the Muslims in various States; |
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New Delhi Muslim Indians constitute roughly 15% of the national electorate, spread over some 15 states. As a politically conscious, pan-Indian minority they can be inspired to have a higher turn-out than average, thus raising their effective voter strength to 20-25%, particularly in 80-100 Lok Sabha constituencies in which they constitute 20% or more of the electorate. The promise by Nehru and Patel in the Constituent Assembly in 1949 to treat the Muslims generously in representation in legislatures because they had ‘voluntarily’ given up reservation is yet to be fulfilled and the Muslims have been consistently under-represented both at central and state levels. The main reason for this has been that secular parties do not field adequate number of Muslim candidates. Yet the Muslims have always supported secular parties, initially the Congress but later others as well, in election. Above all they have never nursed Muslim parties, though many a time they have lacked an effective voice to ventilate their difficulties or grievances or to seek redressal or remedial action in accordance with law from the government of the day. Off and on, the Muslim intelligentsia have been toying with the idea of establishing a Muslim party or atleast a Muslim-core party, a secular party open to all but Muslim led. But the community, divided as well as dispersed, has failed to consolidate itself for such a development. Time has come to remove these cobwebs from the Muslim mind and to convince them that Maulana Azad’s post- independence prescription to refrain from communal politics while legitimately conserving their religious, cultural or social identities is still valid. Thinking Muslims have realized that Muslim communalism can only provide wind to the sails of Hindu communalism and bring them little benefit because there are very few constituencies with Muslim majority in the country. In any case the Muslim party shall stand isolated from the secular mainstream. The Muslims have been often charged with permitting themselves to be exploited as a vote bank. Universally a minority group tends to vote unitedly for an impact on the election which is based on first-past-the-post principle. Faced with their show of strength at the constituency level both the winner and the loser try to retain the goodwill of the Muslim electorate-the winner out of fear of losing support, the loser out of hope for gaining favour. In any case, of late, the Muslims have not voted for any particular party throughout the country or even throughout a state, but for different political parties in different constituencies within the same state. Neither they have voted exclusively for Muslim candidates except when a winnable Muslim candidate was fielded by a major party. The major problem Muslim voters face is multiplicity of candidates fielded by the secular parties in order to nurse their own constituencies. As a result the Muslim voters find it hard to decide which party was likely to win and decide whom to support. This is the reason why Muslim leadership has often suggested to secular parties that even if they can not form a national alliance, at least they should reach mutual understanding and make adjustment in Muslim concentration seats so that the Muslim voters unitedly defend such seats against saffron invasion. The second problem is internal. In Muslim winnable constituencies there are several fake muslim candidates, sometimes fielded by anti-Muslim forces in order to divide Muslim votes. Muslim electorate has by now developed the instinct to recognize the fake, but they are yet to overcome the call of the ‘baradarivad’ which is encouraged by some political parties, not to win but divide Muslim votes and sometimes to add to their own take. A secular alliance may choose its common candidate in such constituencies from the biggest Muslim baradari. In an ideal situation, the Muslim turn-out will be 100% for the secular candidate and thus double the effective value of their votes. Needles to say, the common Muslim candidate should be chosen after carefully testing both his secular credentials as well his place in the community. In the run- up to the General Election 2009, a number of states with a substantial population of Muslims are going to have elections to their Assemblies including Karnataka, Rajasthan, MP and Delhi. The Congress has lost 5 Assembly elections in a row since 2004, the last being Gujarat and Himachal Pradesh and entire north India from West Bengal to Gujarat with the exception of Delhi and Haryana now has non-Congress governments. Since Gujarat debacle, all talk of mid-term poll or premature dissolution of the Lok Sabha has ceased. On the other hand, galvanized by recent victories, the BJP, the party of Hindutva and the major anti-secular and communal political force in the country, has launched a nation-wide campaign to prepare the ground for coming election, under the NDA, with a common policy and programme and Advani as the leader. It is indeed unfortunate that at this juncture some political parties including the CPI(M) are supporting the idea of a Third Front, equidistant from both the Congress and the BJP. The proposed Front may include parties which once formed part of the NDA or supported the UPA from outside. In fact, counting the Left Front itself, this will not be the Third but Fourth Front. Perhaps the Left hopes to reach understanding with the new Front. But will this combination beat the NDA? Undeniably, only the Congress and the BJP are national parties. Equally, whatever ideological, strategic or tactical mistakes the Congress has committed, there is increasing polarization between the two. The ideological space between then is likely to widen and the political space is bound to shrink. This shall make it increasingly difficult for other secular parties or fronts which are seriously committed to combating the charge of the Saffron Brigade without direct or indirect alliance, understanding or adjustment with the Congress. Otherwise, they would only undermine each other to the obvious advantage of the NDA. The Third or the Fourth Front will not attract any Hindutva votes. On the other hand, some secular voters, sitting on the fence may switch over to the NDA as the likely winner if secular forces are divided. For years Muslim organizations particularly, the All India Muslim Majlis-e-Mushawarat have been pleading with all secular parties including the Congress and the CPI(M) to form a National Secular Alliance(NSA). At the same time, they have urging the Congress, which is the biggest secular party all said and done, to come down from its high horse, not to treat other secular parties with disdain or contempt and take the initiative for consolidation. Unfortunately, it tried to attract Hindutvadi votes by adopting the ‘pale saffron’ strategy. This failed again in 2007 as it had in 2002. It alienated secular elements in the civil society, other secular parties in the arena and, what is worse, cast a shadow on its secular credentials. In the present circumstances the Muslims who remain a firm pillar of the secular structure strongly feel that the Congress can not defeat the BJP on its own and must seek to reinforce the secular mansion and realistically embrace other secular parties including the Left, even those which are prepared to break from the NDA, and work out a seat distribution formula which shall give the others the constituencies in which they have been an electoral force. Secondly, to maintain the secular hold over the Centre, all parties have to disconnect state politics from national politics. The voters have been wiser than the parties and are increasingly voting for one party for the Lok Sabha and another for the state Assembly. This tendency should be encouraged. Also to create public confidence the Alliance should be formed before the election with a common policy statement and programme of governance. In a society, as segmented as ours, even Gandhiji realized the need and utility for Muslim political workers to reach out to the Muslim masses. This implies that the secular parties must recognize, respect and respond to the religious and social identity of the Muslim community, appreciate the grievances and difficulties it faces and the constitutional and legal remedies it seeks. This appreciation does not amount to fanning separatism but only ensures that as the country moves forward, Muslim Indians participate in the process at every level and get their due share in the fruits of development. Justice strengthens nationalism and inspires all segments to enter the political arena not only for their own sake but to serve the common cause. The political objective of the Muslim community is crystal clear. Despite frustration and disappointment that is has faced since 1952, even under the UPA government, it seeks a secular government at the centre which is committed to a programme for the uplift of the minorities as of other deprived sections of the society, for fair distribution and for due representation in the power structure. This objective is not only achievable but convergent with the secular order. Once the secular parties form the NSA or at least agree in principle to field common Muslim candidates in Muslim concentration constituencies, the community has to organise itself rising above sect, denomination or baradari or inter organizational rivalry. No doubt, it has an abundance of organizations, a few have a hold on its mind at the ground level. Some operate at district or state or national levels. Some just exist on papers. But in all neighbourhoods one Jamaat or two exist which help in forming Muslim public opinion. At present at the national level Muslims have several bodies which claim to represent the community: the AIMMM, the AIMC, the JUH and the JIH. These four organizations with their state and district linkages have the key role to play, in consultation with other Muslim organizations and institutions. Together they can easily form the Muslim Election Committees at the centre and in major states and perhaps in many LS constituencies. Its national office can collect relevant data on all constituencies. Jointly, they can press the major secular parties to form the proposed Alliance as the only way to confront the saffron storm. Together they can help the Alliance to identify Muslim winnable constituencies and even in selecting common winnable Muslim candidates. Together they can write the Muslim Charter of Aspirations and request the Alliance to incorporate it in their Common Programme. But what is more important, locally they can also assist Muslim voters to enroll themselves in the electoral lists and obtain their election cards; later they can explain to the Muslim electorate the benefit of massive and united voting. At the time of elections, they can participate in the campaign of the common secular candidate and assist the voters. A methodical and systematic approach, positive thinking and hard work can bring the community many dividends. Participation in campaign will train many political and social workers who can later serve as contact with the legislators, find their way in political parties ad some of them may rise to become candidates and legislators. In the worst scenario, if the secular parties fail to come together, form the NSA and field common candidates, the Muslim organizations will have to identify the most winnable candidates of a secular party with the biggest social base in every constituency and persuade the Muslim electorate not to divide its votes but to vote unitedly for the chosen candidate irrespective of the party or religion. The Muslim community has no option but to face the challenge of Hindu communalism and ensure that a secular party wins in constituencies where Muslim votes matter. The survival of the secular order and the promotion of the legitimate aspirations of the Muslim community are intertwined with each other. The installation of a secular government at the centre and due representation of Muslims in the Lok Sabha are compatible and convergent goals; their achievement rests entirely on two factors; formation of National Secular Alliance and nomination of common Muslim candidates in 70 odd constituencies. This will electrify the entire Muslim electorate throughout the country to acatively participate in the campaign of the NSA and to vote unitedly and massively for it and thus save Secular Democracy. New Delhi 1 February, 2008 Syed Shahabuddin (Syed Shahabuddin ) |
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